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The Effects of Judicial Immunization of Passive Sellers 
in Sanns v. Butterfield Ford and a Proposal for the 
Shifting Nature of Fault 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TENSION IN STRICT LIABILITY BETWEEN 
INNOCENT CONSUMERS AND INNOCENT SELLERS 
“A manufacturer is strictly liable . . . when an article he places on the 
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, 
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”1 The 
purpose of strict products liability is to place the cost of injury resulting 
from dangerous products on the producers of those products because 
consumers “are powerless to protect themselves” against such products.2 
Proponents of strict products liability argue that in an “increasingly 
complex and mechanized society”3 there exists an “economic and social 
need”4 to protect innocent consumers from the costs of dangerous 
products. 
The policy of strict products liability has extended into the realm of 
nonmanufacturing parties. Strict products liability, as explained in the 
widely accepted definition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 
402A,5 holds nonmanufacturing parties strictly liable for consumer 
injuries in equal proportion with the manufacturers. Justice Traynor, in 
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,6 enunciated the policy for holding 
nonmanufacturing parties strictly liable, reasoning that the policy affords 
the consumer the greatest possible protection and that it creates an added 
incentive for retailers to offer safe products to the public.7
Despite the strong policy considerations for extending liability to 
protect innocent consumers from bearing the costs of dangerous 
products, the idea of holding nonmanufacturing parties strictly liable has 
 1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
 2. Id. at 901. 
 3. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 1978). 
 4. Id. 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see infra 
note 36 for the text of Section 402A. 
 6. 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964). 
 7. Id. at 171–72. 
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met some resistance. During the 1970s and 1980s, a vast majority of 
legislatures around the country adopted liability-reform statutes designed 
to mitigate the reach of liability doctrines such as joint and several 
liability.8 Many jurisdictions passed legislation designed specifically to 
protect nonmanufacturing parties from the harsh effects of strict products 
liability.9 Thus, two forces—one designed to extend liability and the 
other designed to limit liability—supported opposing goals as 
jurisdictions sought to define the application of strict liability principles. 
Like most jurisdictions in the United States, Utah was caught up in 
both movements and had, until recently, left unresolved the tension 
between extending and limiting strict liability. The combination of the 
Utah Supreme Court’s espousal of Section 402A in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. 
v. Armco Steel Co.10 and the Utah legislature’s passage of the Liability 
Reform Act (LRA)11 in 1986 left Utah courts to determine the extent to 
which nonmanufacturing parties such as distributors and retailers could 
be strictly liable for harm caused by dangerous products. For years, both 
the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals were silent on 
this issue, as no strict liability case presented these courts with a clear 
opportunity for examining exactly how the LRA and Section 402A 
interacted.12 Fortunately, this opportunity recently presented itself in 
Sanns v. Butterfield Ford13 in which the appellate court ruled in favor of 
limiting liability. 
In Sanns, the court of appeals examined a situation in which a 
consumer sought to hold strictly liable a manufacturer and a passive 
seller—a party who did nothing more than pass an unaltered and 
uninspected product from a manufacturer to a consumer.14 The court 
ultimately held that the LRA limited the liability of passive sellers under 
Section 402A.15 The effects of this holding are significant: the decision 
makes strict liability in passive seller situations more akin to traditional 
 8. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and 
the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 210–11, 220–22 (1990). 
 9. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 10. 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
 11. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (2004). 
 12. As will be seen in Part II.C, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
had one opportunity after passage of the LRA to dismiss a passive seller from a strict liability cause 
of action, yet both courts failed to do so. See House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1996), aff’g 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 13. 2004 UT App. 203, 94 P.3d 301. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.1.b; see also Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21.  
 15. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶¶ 11–21. 
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tort theories, such as negligence and culpability, than to Section 402A 
strict liability principles. 
Viewed in its entirety, the Sanns decision created more problems 
than it solved. Not only did it depart from a majority of jurisdictions by 
judicially immunizing passive sellers from suit in strict liability, but it 
failed to describe how its uncertain standard should be applied in future 
strict liability cases. In effect, Sanns sacrificed the interests of harmed 
consumers to the interests of sellers. To correct these negative 
consequences and to ensure fairness to both innocent consumers and 
innocent sellers, Utah courts should adopt a shifting definition of fault 
that balances the requirements of the LRA with the demands of strict 
liability jurisprudence. The first step in this examination would define 
fault as any theory of liability, which would continue to allow all 
potential tortfeasors “who may have caused”16 the harm to be brought 
into a cause of action. The second step would define fault as culpability, 
which would necessitate an examination of culpability among all 
potential tortfeasors and then a distribution of fault to only those 
tortfeasors a trier of fact found culpable.17
Part II of this Note discusses the nature of strict liability as espoused 
in Section 402A, with particular emphasis on the definition of “seller” 
for purposes of strict liability. This Part also describes the development 
of Utah’s strict liability standard, Utah’s conception of comparative fault, 
and the basic principles of the Liability Reform Act. Part III explains 
how the Sanns court departed from the majority of other jurisdictions by 
judicially immunizing passive sellers from strict liability under Section 
402A. Part IV criticizes the court for this unfortunate departure and 
discusses the aforementioned shifting definition of fault that satisfies 
both the policy of allowing the recovery of innocent consumers while 
limiting such recovery from innocent sellers. Part V summarizes the 
Note and states a brief conclusion. 
II. PARTIES SUBJECT TO SECTION 402A STRICT LIABILITY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY IN UTAH JURISPRUDENCE 
Before Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, Utah courts clearly adhered to the 
concept of strict liability espoused in Section 402A,18 which includes 
passive sellers in its definition of parties that can be strictly liable in 
 16. § 78-27-41(1). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
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tort.19 Utah courts were further legislatively obligated to adhere to the 
fault apportionment principles of the Liability Reform Act, which 
prohibited courts from holding a defendant liable for more than its share 
of “fault.”20 What remained unclear before Sanns was how these 
concepts interacted. 
A. Strict Liability’s Place in Tort Law 
Strict liability is a doctrine designed to provide injured victims a 
remedy at law when the victim is not in privity with the tortfeasor and 
when traditional principles of recovery, such as negligence and breach of 
warranty, are unavailable as a means of relief. Simply put, strict liability 
is liability imposed upon a party regardless of the amount of care it may 
have taken to prevent injury to another.21
 The basic distinction between strict liability and negligence is that 
strict liability is liability without fault.22 Whereas negligence requires the 
plaintiff to show that the tortfeasor failed to adhere to an ordinary level 
of care so as to avoid harm to another party, strict liability “is imposed 
even though a person has committed no legal fault consisting of violation 
of common law or statutory duty.”23 As one commentator explained in 
comparing strict liability and negligence, “Strict liability looks at the 
[cause of harm] itself . . . whereas negligence looks at the act of the 
[tortfeasor] and the court determines if the [tortfeasor] exercised ordinary 
care.”24  
A further distinction between strict liability and negligence is that 
strict liability is a much rarer cause of action than negligence. While a 
harmed party can seek to impose negligence in practically any tort 
action, courts typically recognize strict liability only in limited cases 
involving either inherently dangerous products25 or “ultrahazardous 
 19. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 20. §§ 78-27-38 to -39. 
 21. See, e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 172 (2000); 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 545 
(1996). 
 22. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 172 (2000).  
 23. Id.; see also David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products 
Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 750 (noting that the “commonsense distinction” between 
strict liability and negligence is that negligence is “based on fault” and strict liability is “no-fault 
liability”). 
 24. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 545 (1996). 
 25. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (applying strict 
liability against the manufacturer of a dangerous tool); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (applying strict liability to a steel structure that collapsed). 
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activities for which negligence is an inadequate deterrent or remedy.”26 
 A particular form of strict liability that deals exclusively with 
inherently dangerous products is strict products liability—a doctrine that 
holds the manufacturer and the seller of a product strictly liable for their 
dangerous products.27 The California Supreme Court, in Brown v. 
Superior Court,28 explained that strict products liability “eliminates the 
necessity for the injured party to prove that the manufacturer of the 
product which caused injury was negligent. It focuses not on the conduct 
of the manufacturer but on the product itself, and holds the manufacturer 
liable if the product was defective.”29
 The purpose of strict products liability is “to [e]nsure that the costs 
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the 
injured persons.”30 Commentators have noted that consumers typically 
no longer have “the means or sufficient skill to investigate for 
[themselves] the soundness of a product”31 and that “[c]onsumers no 
longer approach products warily, but accept them on faith, relying on the 
reputation of the manufacturer or the trademark.”32 Thus, strict products 
liability allows an injured consumer to recover damages from the 
manufacturer of a dangerous product, regardless of the manufacturer’s 
negligence.33
Yet despite the absence of a negligence requirement in cases of strict 
products liability, strict products liability has never been equated to a 
concept of absolute liability whereby a manufacturer would become an 
 26. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 172 (2000); see, e.g., Luthinger v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) 
(imposing strict liability for the release of poisonous gas); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 
2d 133 (La. 1971) (imposing strict liability for poisonous gas in quantity in a dangerous place); 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 519 (explaining strict liability in cases of “abnormally dangerous 
activit[ies]”). 
 27. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 28. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
 29. Id. at 474. 
 30. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
 31. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 520 (1996). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 618 P.2d 1230, 1231 (N.M. 1980) (stating that 
strict products liability “allow[s] an injured consumer to recover against a seller or manufacturer 
without the requirement of proving ordinary negligence”); see also Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 
319, 325–26 (Alaska 1970) (explaining that strict products liability is based on a defect in the 
product rather than on negligent conduct); People ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bua, 226 N.E.2d 6, 
15–16 (Ill. 1967) (holding that in cases of strict products liability, negligence does not need to be 
proved). 
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insurer of consumer safety.34 The doctrine of strict products liability is 
meant to place “the product supplier in the role of a guarantor of the 
product’s safety, but it does not make the supplier an insurer against all 
injuries caused by the product.”35 These principles of strict products 
liability are exemplified in the widely accepted Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 402A.36
B. Section 402A, Passive Sellers, and Passive Seller Immunization 
The doctrine of strict products liability was first introduced into 
American jurisprudence by Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.,37 in which for the first time a manufacturer was held 
liable for its products absent a showing of negligence.38 This decision 
served as the basis of Section 402A, which has been adopted by a 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States and has formed the 
foundation of their strict products liability doctrine.39 The practical effect 
 34. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981) (“But strict 
liability in tort is not the equivalent of making the manufacturer or seller absolutely liable as an 
insurer of the product and its use.”); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 1978) 
(“From its inception, . . . strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute liability. As has 
been repeatedly expressed, under strict liability the manufacturer does not thereby become the 
insurer of the safety of the product’s user.”). 
 35. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 522 (1996). 
 36. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 402A , reads as follows: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused 
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold. 
 (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) Applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
 37. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). 
 38. As one commentator has noted, Greenman “was the first time a majority opinion had 
bypassed legal fiction and imposed strict liability for injuries resulting from a defective product.” 
Charles E. Cantú, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities from 
Strict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel 
Lines of Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REV. 31, 41 (2001). 
 39. See O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Wachtel v. Rosol, 271 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1970); West v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970); 
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421 (Idaho 1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 
(Ill. 1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prod., Inc., 258 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970); Hawkeye-
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of Section 402A is that an injured consumer no longer must prove 
negligence or privity of contract in order to recover from a manufacturer. 
Section 402A affords neither manufacturers nor sellers protection from 
strict liability when a product is unreasonably dangerous and causes 
harm to the consumer. 
1. Section 402A 
Section 402A sets out a general test for determining whether a party 
can be held strictly liable for damages caused by a product that is 
“unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”40 Section 402A 
“states a special rule applicable to sellers of products. The rule is one of 
strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or 
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of the product.”41 The basic elements of a Section 
402A cause of action are as follows: (1) one who is engaged in the 
business of selling (2) sells any product (3) in a defective condition (4) 
that is unreasonably dangerous (5) to the user or consumer or his 
property.42 These elements illustrate that the focus of Section 402A in 
determining liability is on the product rather than on the defendant’s 
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 
(Kan. 1976); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); Adams v. 
Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 
1976); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. 
Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 
1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Kohler v. 
Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 1971); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972); 
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 
732 (N.M. 1972); Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Temple v. Wean 
United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977); Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 
1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966); 
Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1971); Hatfield v. Atlas Enters. Inc., 262 S.E.2d 
900 (S.C. 1980); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 
1967); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 
1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 
(Wyo. 1986); see also 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 525 (1996) (“The great majority of 
American jurisdictions have adopted strict liability in the version represented by the Restatement of 
Torts 2d § 402A.”). 
 40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 402A(1). 
 41. Id. cmt. a. 
 42. Id. § 402A(1). 
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conduct.43 Although a thorough examination of each of these elements is 
beyond the scope of this Note,44 a more careful examination of the first 
element will demonstrate that Section 402A’s definition of seller clearly 
calls for the strict liability of passive sellers. 
   
a. “One who sells.” The first prong of the strict products liability test 
in Section 402A states, “One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer.”45 In clarifying this language, the comments 
to Section 402A make it abundantly clear that any professional seller can 
be subject to strict products liability: “The rule stated in this Section 
applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use 
or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a 
product [and] to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor . . . .”46 In 
fact, the only practical limitation in the language of Section 402A is that 
it excludes the “occasional seller of food or other such products who is 
not engaged in that activity as part of his business.”47 This limitation 
clearly does not exclude a passive seller such as a distributor or a 
retailer.48
 
b. Passive sellers. Section 402A’s extension of strict liability to 
passive sellers is a sweeping expansion of liability. “Passive seller” is a 
term used to describe nonmanufacturing parties along the chain of 
distribution; typical examples of a passive seller include parties such as 
 43. See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and 
Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 217 (1987) (stating that Section 402A’s 
“central focus is on the product, not the conduct of the defendant”). 
 44. For a more complete examination of the individual elements in Section 402A, see 63 AM. 
JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 556–633 (1996); Lynn S. Davies, Comment, Strict Products Liability 
in Utah Following Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 1980 UTAH L. REV. 577, 580–87; 
Robert A. McConnell, Comment, Survey of Utah Strict Products Liability Law: From Hahn to the 
Present and Beyond, 1992 BYU L. REV. 1173, 1173–87 (dealing specifically with how Utah courts 
have interpreted each element of Section 402A).  
 45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 402A(1). 
 46. Id. cmt. f (emphasis added). 
 47. Id.  
 48. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 560 (1996) (noting that “the application of strict 
liability does not hinge on technical limitation of the terms ‘manufacturer’ or ‘seller’ as used in 
Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A”). 
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wholesalers, distributors, and retailers.49 Justice Traynor first enunciated 
the rationale for holding a passive seller strictly liable in the landmark 
decision Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.50 in which a dealer who had 
done nothing more than sell a defective product to a plaintiff was held 
strictly liable. Vandermark—which predated the publication of Section 
402A by one year51—held that it is permissible to hold passive sellers 
strictly liable because “[r]etailers like manufacturers are engaged in the 
business of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of 
the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost 
of injuries resulting from defective products.”52 Vandermark further 
reasoned that holding passive sellers strictly liable “affords maximum 
protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the [passive 
seller]” because passive sellers and manufacturers “can adjust the cost of 
such protection between them in the course of their continuing business 
relationship.”53 Other courts have reasoned that the sellers have the 
opportunity to seek contribution and indemnification from manufacturers 
further up the chain of distribution.54 This rationale, however, has been 
criticized in that it “generates wasteful legal costs” because of the time 
and expense involved in forcing passive sellers to engage in another 
lawsuit to seek indemnification from the manufacturer.55
On the whole, the language of Section 402A includes passive sellers 
as strictly liable parties, and most courts have agreed with the policy 
behind this rule.56 Recognizing the harsh realities of the judicially 
adopted doctrine of strict products liability and the inherent waste of 
 49. See Cavico, supra note 43, at 218–23 for a discussion on holding retailers, wholesalers, 
and distributors strictly liable. See also Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21, 94 P.3d 
301, 307 (implying that a passive seller is a seller who “[does] not participate in the design, 
manufacture, engineering, testing, or assembly of the [product]”). 
 50. 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964). 
 51. Cavico, supra note 43, at 217–18. 
 52. Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171. 
 53. Id. at 171–72. 
 54. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hanscom Bros. Inc., 331 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. 1974); Duncan v. Cessna 
Aircraft Corp., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984). For a more detailed analysis of underlying policy 
considerations both for and against holding passive sellers strictly liable in tort, see Cavico, supra 
note 43, at 215–33. Cavico emphasizes the contribution/ 
indemnification rationale, stating that the “imposition of strict tort liability upon non-manufacturers 
is based on the significant rationale that retailers and wholesalers are entitled to indemnity from the 
manufacturer.” Id. at 229. 
 55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, cmt. e (1998). 
 56. Cavico, supra note 43, at 218 (“A great majority of states have followed the Vandermark 
principle.” (emphasis added)). 
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contribution and indemnification suits, many states began to enact 
legislation designed to curb the effects of Section 402A on passive 
sellers. 
2. The legislative immunization of passive sellers 
Because passive sellers fall within the definition of strict liability in 
Section 402A, the most common way to protect such sellers from Section 
402A liability is to statutorily exempt them from strict liability suits. 
Many states began to enact product liability reform statutes by the end of 
the 1970s,57 and many of these product liability reform measures 
specifically exempted passive sellers from suit in strict liability.58 By 
legislatively immunizing passive sellers from the harsh demands of 
Section 402A, these statutes necessarily subordinated the doctrines of 
Section 402A to the legislative protections for passive sellers: to the 
extent that passive sellers complied with the specific statutory 
requirements of the jurisdiction, they were immune from strict products 
liability.59
 57. See id. at 237–40. 
 58. Certain states enacted legislation prohibiting an action in strict products liability unless 
the seller is either the manufacturer of the product or participated in the manufacture of the product. 
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (2004); IND. CODE § 34-20-2-3 (2004); NEB. REV. ST. § 25-
21,181 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 (Michie 2004). Other states have adopted a 
different legislative approach by prohibiting strict products liability actions against passive sellers 
unless no remedy at law exists against the manufacturer. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 
(2004); IDAHO CODE § [6-1407](4)(a), (b) (Michie 2004); 735 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/2-621(a)-(c) 
(2004); IOWA CODE § 613.18 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306(d), (e) (2003); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 411.340 (Michie 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2004); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 544.41 (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.762 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-
2 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-04 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 
2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 7-72.040(2)(a), (b) (2004). In an 
examination of the different types of statutory protections for passive sellers of goods in 1987, Frank 
J. Cavico Jr. identifies four different types of statutes: (1) indemnification statutes that require, under 
certain circumstances, the manufacturer to indemnify the seller; (2) “sealed container statutes” that 
protect sellers when the defective product was sold in its original sealed container, or more liberally, 
if the product was sold in its original condition; (3) absolute bars that “absolutely exempt[] the non-
manufacturer from strict tort product liability”; and (4) partial bars that typically protect the seller if 
the manufacturer is in existence and is “able to satisfy judgment.” Cavico, supra note 43, at 237–40. 
 59. It is important to note that the rationale behind most of these enactments was not only to 
curb the burdensome effects of bringing passive sellers into a claim of strict liability, but also to 
reduce the time and expense of forcing passive sellers to engage in costly and lengthy contribution 
and indemnification suits against the manufacturer to recover any losses associated with being held 
jointly and severally liable for a product’s defects. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 1, cmt. e (1998), which explains the rationale for these legislative enactments as 
follows: 
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While many legislatures enacted passive seller immunization statutes 
to mitigate the effects of Section 402A, a significant number of 
jurisdictions that had adopted Section 402A enacted no such measure.60 
Because Section 402A contains no protection for passive sellers, those 
jurisdictions that have enacted no passive seller exemption to strict 
liability have necessarily continued to subject passive sellers to the strict 
liability doctrines of Section 402A. Prior to Sanns, Utah was such a 
jurisdiction. 
C. Utah’s Strict Liability Jurisprudence 
Although Utah explicitly adopted Section 402A as its basis for strict 
liability, no Utah court ever explicitly stated that a passive seller could be 
held strictly liable in Utah. Yet before Sanns, there was every indication 
that passive sellers could be liable under Section 402A.61
 
Legislation has been enacted in many jurisdictions that, to some extent, immunizes 
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors from strict liability. The legislation is premised 
on the belief that bringing nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors into products liability 
litigation generates wasteful legal costs. Although liability in most cases is ultimately 
passed on to the manufacturer who is responsible for creating the product defect, 
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors must devote resources to protect their interests. 
In most situations, therefore, immunizing nonmanufacturers from strict liability saves 
those resources without jeopardizing the plaintiff’s interests. To assure plaintiffs access to 
a responsible and solvent product seller or distributor, the statutes generally provide that 
the nonmanufacturing seller or distributor is immunized from strict liability only if: (1) 
the manufacturer is subject to the jurisdiction of the court of plaintiff’s domicile; and (2) 
the manufacturer is not, nor is likely to become, insolvent. 
Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying 
Florida law and holding that an importer of a car could be subject to strict liability for a dangerous 
car); Oser v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that a retail seller is 
subject to strict liability for a defective shopping bag that caused injury to the plaintiff); Curry v. Sile 
Distribs., 727 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 
(Cal. 1964) (rejecting defendant’s assertion that strict liability applies only to manufacturers and 
applying strict liability to retailers); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 809 (D.C. 
1970); Lawrence v. Brandell Prods., Inc., 619 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Giuffrida v. 
Panasonic Indus. Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1994); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 626–27 (Okla. 
1974); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 898 n.3 (Pa. 1975); see also M. 
STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.19 (2d ed. 1988) (“Decisions in most jurisdictions have 
held that the doctrine of strict tort liability may be applied against the ordinary retailer in products 
liability cases.”); Cavico, supra note 43, at 218 (explaining that a great majority of jurisdictions have 
applied the principles of Vandermark in ruling that retailers can be held strictly liable in tort). 
 61. One of the most troubling aspects of the Sanns decision is that, without discussing 
Section 402A, the court ruled that passive sellers could not be held strictly liable. In the section of 
the opinion dealing with the strict liability of Butterfield Ford, the court mentions Section 402A only 
once in a string citation. See Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 15, 94 P.3d 301, 306. 
See infra Part IV.A.2 for a full examination of the court’s treatment of Section 402A. 
4BUR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:35:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
488 
 
Utah adopted Section 402A as its basis for strict liability in Ernest 
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.62 In Hahn, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that a “manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for 
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”63
A short time later, the court held that comparative fault principles 
would play a part in strict liability analysis. Comparative fault is the 
principle that allows for a comparison between the culpability of the 
defendants and the culpability of the plaintiffs in a tort action to ensure 
that the defendants are liable only to the extent of their culpability.64 
Comparative fault assumes that an appropriate distribution of fault and 
damages requires such a comparison of fault between defendants and 
plaintiffs.65 In Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,66 the court followed the 
logic and the policy of Hahn67 while extending Utah’s strict liability 
doctrine to include comparative principles.68 Notably, the court allowed 
the concept of culpability to play a part in strict liability analysis.69 
 62. 601 P.2d 152, 155–59 (Utah 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Hahn 
decision traces the development of the strict liability doctrine back to MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), in which, for the first time, a court found that absent privity 
between a manufacturer of a product and the product’s user, a manufacturer could still be liable to 
the user if the product was negligently made and the resulting defect could cause serious harm to the 
user. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156. Utah adopted the MacPherson standard in Hooper v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953). For the language of Section 402A, see supra note 36. 
 63. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 
(Cal. 1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1428 (1996). 
 65. The LRA contains a comparative fault provision: “A person seeking recovery may 
recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons 
immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery . . . .” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-
38(2) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 66. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). 
 67. Like the majority in Hahn, the Mulherin majority declared the policy for strict liability 
and the inclusion of comparative principles in strict liability as follows: “strict liability in tort is not 
the equivalent of making the manufacturer or seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and 
its use.” Id. at 1302. 
 68. For a discussion on the common law development from an “all-or-nothing” contributory 
negligence theory to comparative fault standards under which the plaintiff’s actions could potentially 
mitigate recovery, see Lee A. Wright, Comment, Utah’s Comparative Apportionment: What 
Happened to the Comparison?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 554–59. In House v. Armour of America, 
Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court stressed that since Mulherin, “subsequent 
Utah court decisions have departed from the strict all-or-nothing rule.” Id. at 344. 
 69. Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1304 (“Other courts have rejected the application of comparative 
fault principles to strict liability claims because culpable conduct is not at issue in strict liability, 
only causation. We find this unpersuasive.” (footnote omitted)). See infra Part IV.B for further 
analysis of this point in cases involving the strict liability of passive sellers. 
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Although affirmative defenses to strict products liability exist, those 
defenses are “not a complete bar to any recovery from defendants on the 
basis of strict liability, but should be applied according to comparative 
principles.”70
Despite the adoption of Section 402A in Hahn and the clarification 
in Mulherin that comparative principles were a part of the strict liability 
analysis, application of Section 402A was not as easy as the Hahn court 
may have initially thought. One of the continuing difficulties of Section 
402A was defining who a seller is for strict liability purposes. 
Although Utah courts never explicitly stated that Section 402A 
applied against passive sellers in Utah, before Sanns there was every 
indication that this was the case. Utah courts have applied strict products 
liability to various types of “sellers,” including defective steel joist 
manufacturers,71 winch manufacturers,72 airplane manufacturers,73 drug 
manufacturers,74 water tank manufacturers,75 and bullet-resistant vest 
manufacturers and distributors.76 While applying a strict products 
liability analysis to this broad variety of sellers, Utah courts have been 
reluctant to classify other entities such as “residential subdividers,”77 
component parts manufacturers (when the component parts were 
subsequently integrated into a larger product),78 and “compounding 
pharmacist[s]”79 as sellers because these entities and the facts of their 
 70. Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1303. 
 71. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 152–59 (Utah 1979). 
 72. Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1301–04. 
 73. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673–74 (Utah 1985). 
 74. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91–95 (Utah 1991). One should note that in 
Upjohn the court accepted and expanded comment k to Section 402A and held that “all FDA-
approved prescription medications” are “unavoidably unsafe,” which characterization precludes an 
application of strict products liability against the manufacturer of the FDA-approved drug. Id. at 90 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1355–57 (Utah 1996). 
 76. House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), aff’g 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). This case is especially relevant for purposes of this Note as it allows a strict liability 
claim against both a retailer and a manufacturer. The appellate court stated that “[s]trict liability may 
extend not only to the dealer and retail seller of the product, but to the manufacturer of the product 
and the manufacturers of its component parts.” House, 886 P.2d at 553 (internal quotations omitted) 
(quoting Oak Grove Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co., 668 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983)). 
 77. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 770–72 (Utah 1987). 
 78. House, 886 P.2d at 553; Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Maack v. Res. Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 581–82 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 79. Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43 ¶¶ 20–36, 79 P.3d 922. The 
court defined a “compounding pharmacist” as one who “combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to 
create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient.” Id. ¶ 25 (internal quotations 
4BUR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:35:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
490 
 
individual cases simply did not lend themselves well to a Section 402A 
analysis. 
It is clear from these cases that the final manufacturers of dangerous 
products could always be brought into a claim under a theory of strict 
liability in Utah because they fit well within the definition of seller in 
Section 402A.80 Less clear is whether passive sellers such as distributors 
were likewise vulnerable to Section 402A liability because distributors 
were rarely defendants in strict liability cases in Utah.81 In fact, in each 
instance that a Utah court examined a claim of strict liability against a 
manufacturer and a passive retailer, the court was silent on whether the 
passive retailer was properly included in the claim.82
For example, House v. Armour of America is one of the few Utah 
cases that explicitly dealt with a claim alleging strict liability against 
both a manufacturer and a retailer.83 In House, the court presumed that 
retailers could be brought under a claim of strict liability in accordance 
with the prevailing Section 402A view.84 The trial court granted 
summary judgment for three separate defendants—the final manufacturer 
of a bullet-resistant vest, the manufacturer of a component of the vest, 
and the retailer who sold the vest.85 Upon its review, the appellate court 
reversed the summary judgment for both the final manufacturer and the 
retailer, but it upheld the summary judgment for the component part 
manufacturer.86 In upholding the grant of summary judgment to the 
omitted) (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002)). The court 
determined that compounding was within the statutory definition of pharmacist activity and therefore 
the pharmacist who engaged in compounding was not engaging in manufacturing for purposes of 
strict products liability. Id. ¶ 33. 
 80. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text. 
 81. The court in Mulherin noted in dicta that strict liability holds “manufacturers and sellers 
responsible for the injuries caused by their products.” Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 
1301, 1303 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 
 82. See House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), aff’g 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Raithouse v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989); Dowland v. 
Lyman Prods. for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982). 
 83. See House, 886 P.2d at 544–45. 
 84. See id. at 546–47. Because the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in House affirmed the 
appellate court’s decision and referred repeatedly to that decision, this Note will refer both to the 
appellate court and Supreme Court decisions to fully analyze the strict liability issue involved in the 
case. See e.g., House, 929 P.2d at 342 (stating “[w]e agree with the court of appeals on all issues and 
affirm”). 
 85. House, 886 P.2d at 544–45. 
 86. Id. at 553–55. It is not entirely clear from the appellate court’s decision in House whether 
both the final manufacturer and the retailer were being examined underneath the rubric of strict 
liability because the court includes a section dealing with the retailer’s breach of warranty of fitness 
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component part manufacturer, the court stressed that although “[s]trict 
liability may extend not only to the dealer and retail seller of the 
product, but to the manufacturer of the product and the manufacturers of 
its component parts,”87 the component part manufacturer cannot be liable 
when it “does not take part in the design or assembly of the final system 
or product.”88
In House, both the appellate court and the Utah Supreme Court had 
every opportunity to dismiss from a suit in strict products liability a 
passive retailer who had done nothing more than “engage[] in the 
business of selling law enforcement supplies such as bullet resistant 
vests,” yet both courts refused to do so.89 This failure to dismiss the 
passive seller strongly suggests that both the Utah Supreme Court and 
the Utah Court of Appeals accepted without question or analysis Section 
402A’s standard of allowing passive sellers in suits of strict liability.90
D. The Liability Reform Act 
While both the appellate court and the supreme court recognized in 
House that passive sellers were subject to Section 402A suits, the courts 
did not consider how strict liability principles were affected by Utah’s 
Liability Reform Act.91 Consequently, whether strict liability principles 
for a particular purpose. See id. at 545–55. However, the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in House 
focused solely on the strict liability claim and upheld the appellate court’s reversal of summary 
judgment for the final manufacturer and the retailer. House, 929 P.2d at 342. 
 87. House, 886 P.2d at 553 (quoting Oak Grove Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co., 668 P.2d 
1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg., 798 F.2d 700, 715 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 89. Id. at 545. 
 90. Similar to House, the Utah Supreme Court also implied that passive sellers may be 
included as a defendant in strict liability in Raithous v. Saab-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 
1158 (Utah 1989). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court examined a strict products liability claim 
involving an incident in which a car caught fire and in which the manufacturer, the American 
distributor, and the local dealer were codefendants in the cause of action. Although the crux of the 
court’s analysis focused on the applicable statute of limitations, the court made no indication that it 
was improper to bring the sellers in the chain of distribution into the action under a theory of strict 
liability. See id. at 1160–62; see also McConnell, supra note 44, at 1175–76 (stating that the Utah 
Supreme Court “has implicitly acknowledged that non-manufacturing sellers can be held liable 
under a strict products liability theory”). 
 91. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (2004). The passage of the LRA in 1986 was part 
of a nationwide tort reform movement that sought to ameliorate the harshness of certain common 
law principles such as joint and several liability. See Brad C. Betebenner, The Liability Reform Act: 
An Approach to Equitable Application, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 89, 91–93 (1987); Sanders & Joyce, supra 
note 8, at 210–11, 220–22. The author stands in the debt of Mr. David N. Wolf, an attorney with 
Snell & Wilmer LLP in Salt Lake City, who argued the Sanns case before the Utah Court of Appeals 
on behalf of Butterfield Ford and who provided the author with the briefs from the appeal and with 
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could be justified in light of the LRA’s abrogation of joint and several 
liability remained unclear. 
Although the LRA reforms tort liability in Utah, it includes no 
express immunization for passive sellers from strict liability suits such as 
those found in passive seller immunization statutes.92 Instead, the LRA 
focuses solely on fault apportionment while abolishing the concept of 
joint and several liability in an effort to ensure “basic fairness.”93 To 
achieve this fairness, the LRA prohibits joint and several liability among 
multiple tortfeasers. The LRA states that “[n]o defendant is liable to any 
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant.”94 It further limits the amount a 
plaintiff can recover from any one defendant by providing that “the 
maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant.”95 Finally, the LRA precludes the practice of contribution 
suits.96
Nonetheless, the LRA’s efforts to ensure fairness in fault 
apportionment is handicapped by a definition of fault97 that is anything 
numerous helpful suggestions regarding the application of the LRA to strict products liability 
jurisprudence. The information regarding the tort reform movement in the 1980s was introduced to 
the author by Mr. Wolf and by the brief on behalf of Butterfield Ford. See Brief of the Appellee at 
15–17, Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, 94 P.3d 301 (No. 20030497-CA) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Butterfield Ford Brief]. Between 1985 and 1988, forty-eight jurisdictions passed 
acts restructuring tort liability, and thirty of those states reformed joint and several liability 
principles. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 210 n.13, 220–22. 
 92. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 93. 46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986). As one senator observed 
during debate on the bill, “[t]he defendant ought to be on the hook only for its own percentage of 
damages, but ought not be the guarantor for everyone else’s damages.” Id., quoted in Butterfield 
Ford Brief, supra note 91, at 18. 
 94. § 78-27-38(3). 
 95. § 78-27-40(1). 
 96. § 78-27-40(2). Contribution suits are “a method for tortfeasors forced to pay damages 
greater than their proportion of fault to recover from other joint tortfeasors in a separate action.” 
Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also 
Bruyner v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 1976) (Ellett, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1977). 
 97. § 78-27-37(2). The language defining fault is as follows: 
“Fault” means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing 
or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including 
negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, 
modification, or abuse of a product. 
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but clear.98 For example, although the LRA is not designed as a measure 
to protect passive sellers or even as a measure designed to deal with strict 
liability, during passage of the bill the legislature debated whether the 
LRA would have any affect on Utah’s concept of strict liability and 
whether strict liability could be considered “fault” for purposes of the 
bill.99 In defining fault for purposes of the application of the LRA, the 
plain language of the statute includes both strict liability and products 
liability as types of fault,100 but the language contains no guidance 
concerning how the LRA affects these strict liability principles.101
Id. 
 98. The Sanns court noted that the inclusion of strict liability is one of the major confusions 
in the LRA’s definition of fault: “The legislature’s inclusion of ‘strict liability’ in defining ‘fault’ is 
confusing and somewhat problematic . . . .” Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 14 n.5, 
94 P.3d 301. 
 99. Some of the explanation of the LRA given by then Assistant Attorney General Steve 
Sorenson during the debate is particularly relevant to this Note: 
[The LRA] is a comparative negligence statute. The law does not, or the bill does not . . . 
change the substantive law of strict liability or breach of warranty at all. What it says is if 
you have multiple defendants, one of whom is guilty of negligence, one of whom is 
guilty of strict liability, the jury in apportioning fault, apportions fault between those 
parties regardless of the theory on which the party is liable. This is an issue with which 
the Supreme Court struggled in the, I think it’s the Mulherin case, a couple of years ago, 
and really hasn’t known how to handle it, so we think that’s a good clarification that if 
you have difference [sic] defendants guilty on different theories of liability, nonetheless 
that’s all considered fault for the purpose of apportioning damages by the jury. 
46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986) (statement of Assistant Attorney 
General Steve Sorenson). 
 100. § 78-27-37(2). For the complete text of the LRA’s definition of “fault,” see supra note 
97. In Sanns, the court explained that the confusion created by including strict liability in the 
definition of fault is due to the fact that “unlike negligence, strict liability does not require an 
examination of a party’s fault. Strict liability is ‘the breach of an absolute duty to make something 
safe.’” Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 14 n.5 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 101. Although strict liability is included in the LRA’s definition of fault, before Sanns it was 
unclear how this inclusion was to be interpreted. This was one of the main points of argument for 
both parties in the Sanns case. Butterfield Ford argued that the statute should be read with emphasis 
on the first clause (any actionable “breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages”), which mandated some culpable conduct on the part of the 
defendant before the defendant could be apportioned fault under the LRA. Butterfield Ford Brief, 
supra note 91, at 25–26 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2)). Sanns, on the other hand, argued 
that such an interpretation of the statute would render strict liability nothing more than negligence 
and that emphasis should be given to the fact that strict liability was included in the list of possible 
ways of being at fault for purposes of fault apportionment. Reply Brief of the Appellant at 6–12, 
Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, 94 P.3d 301 (No. 20030497-CA) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Sanns Brief]. Sanns further argued as follows: 
The LRA no more abolished strict products liability for a passive retailer than it abolished 
liability for any other tortfeasor whose liability was previously governed by principles of 
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A few cases dealing with the application of the LRA foreshadowed 
what was to come in Sanns and shed some light on how the LRA 
interacts with principles such as comparative fault and multiple 
tortfeasors. First, in S.H. v. Bistryski.102 the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that “[b]y including ‘strict liability’ in the definition of fault, the 
legislature clearly intended comparative fault principles to be applied to 
strict liability claims.”103 The court thereby recognized that the 
comparative principles of Mulherin would continue under the LRA.104
In National Service Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Manufacturing 
Co.,105 the Utah Court of Appeals took occasion to explain the 
application of the LRA against multiple tortfeasors. In a lengthy review 
of the doctrines, similarities, and differences of indemnification and 
contribution, the court concluded that both rest on a “common 
foundation” that “attempt[s] to ensure that parties are not held unfairly 
liable to an extent greater than their degree of fault.”106 Because the 
doctrines are so similar, the court ruled that the LRA’s ban on 
contribution suits likewise prohibits indemnification suits.107 The court 
recognized that the LRA’s ban on joint and several liability is entirely 
inconsistent with suits that seek redistribution of fault because the LRA 
mandates the fault be properly apportioned in the first place.108 This 
joint and several liability, contribution or indemnity. At most, it simply changed the way 
in which liability is to be apportioned in the case of multiple tortfeasors. 
Id. at 10. 
 102. 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996). 
 103. Id. at 1380. 
 104. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Utah 1981); supra notes 64–
70 and accompanying text. 
 105. 937 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
 106. Id. at 554. 
 107. Id. at 555; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. l (1977) (“In a state 
following comparative contribution, or contribution according to the comparative fault of the parties, 
contribution may tend to merge with indemnity, and the technical distinctions of indemnity may 
become less important. . . . The eventual outcome is likely to be a single remedy based on 
comparative fault.”). The court explained that the abrogation of contribution and indemnification 
necessitated the joining of all potentially liable defendants into the cause of action: “we recognize 
that prohibiting subsequent apportionment suits essentially requires joint tortfeasor codefendants to 
raise cross-claims against each other in the underlying tort action or else such claims may be lost. As 
such, cross-claims for apportionment among joint tortfeasor codefendants are mandatory.” Nat’l 
Serv., 937 P.2d at 556. 
 108. Nat’l Serv., 937 P.2d at 555 (reasoning that the ban on contribution suits “comports with 
the overall statutory scheme which abolishes joint and several liability and renders tortfeasors liable 
only to the extent of their own proportion of fault”). 
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logic resonated with the Sanns court and, as will be seen, dictated much 
of its holding. 
Before Sanns, comparative fault principles continued to function 
under the LRA and neither contribution nor indemnification suits were 
allowed. The stage was set to determine the exact definition of fault 
within the meaning of the LRA and to examine whether passive sellers 
could be included in such a definition. If passive sellers were included, 
this would, in effect, determine whether the LRA could function as an 
indirect immunization of passive sellers from strict liability in 
contravention of Section 402A. 
III. SANNS V. BUTTERFIELD FORD 
A. The Facts of Sanns 
On December 7, 2000, Sanns was a passenger in a 1999 Ford 
Econoline E-350 van and was injured when the driver of the van lost 
control, causing the van to roll over several times near American Fork, 
Utah.109 The van was owned by the Utah Department of Corrections, and 
at the time of the accident, Sanns was acting in his capacity as a prison 
guard.110 Sanns brought an action alleging claims of strict liability, 
breach of warranty, and negligence against both Ford, the manufacturer 
of the van, and Butterfield Ford, the distributor of the van.111 Butterfield 
Ford immediately made a motion for summary judgment, which it 
ultimately won.112 While the case against Ford was removed to the 
 109. Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 2, 94 P.3d 301; Butterfield Ford Brief, 
supra note 91, at 4–5. 
 110. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 2. 
 111. Id. ¶ 3. 
 112. It is worth reciting the appellate court’s explanation of the trial court’s reasoning in 
granting Butterfield Ford’s motion for summary judgment. 
The court found that (i) Sanns failed to present any credible evidence to show that 
Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributor of the van; (ii) Butterfield Ford 
did not design, manufacture, test, assemble, package, alter, or ship the vehicle; (iii) the 
fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged that a van has a higher center of gravity than a 
sports car does not create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew of any 
design defects in the van; and (iv) the [LRA] does not permit a cause of action for strict 
liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a 
design or manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a 
named party in the action. 
Id. 
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United States District Court,113 Sanns appealed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on behalf of Butterfield Ford to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
In his appeal, Sanns argued that the trial court was wrong in finding 
that Butterfield Ford was not negligent in its sale of the van114 and “in 
holding that a passive retailer can no longer be liable in strict products 
liability under Utah law.”115 Sanns argued that the LRA did not alter the 
doctrine of strict products liability. Instead, the LRA recognized strict 
liability claims but altered how liability is to be apportioned when 
multiple tortfeasors are named in an action.116 Thus, the appellate court 
was left to decide how to interpret the LRA in actions involving a strict 
liability claim against a purely passive distributor. 
B. The Logic of Sanns 
The Sanns court ultimately held that passive sellers cannot be 
brought under a claim of strict liability because if they could be found 
strictly liable, they might be found liable to a degree greater than their 
culpability without ability to seek contribution or indemnification from 
more liable parties.117 The court reasoned that such a scenario is 
unacceptable under the LRA and thereby found that the LRA contained 
an indirect immunization for passive sellers.118
Implicit in this holding is that—despite its assertions to the 
contrary—the court equated the LRA’s definition of fault, particularly 
strict liability fault, to a concept of culpability. The court began by noting 
that the LRA “does not prohibit a factfinder from assigning liability to a 
party under a claim for strict liability” because strict liability is included 
in the definition of fault.119 While stating that “[t]he . . . inclusion of 
 113. Id. ¶ 3 n.1; Butterfield Ford Brief, supra note 91, at 4. One of Butterfield Ford’s 
contentions to the appellate court was that Butterfield Ford was included in the action solely to 
destroy diversity jurisdiction and thereby preclude Ford from removing the case to federal court. Id. 
at 27. 
 114. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 6. Because the negligence aspect of the decision is beyond 
the scope of this Note, it will not be discussed further, other than to note that the court had little 
difficulty in dismissing this claim. It agreed with the trial court that Butterfield Ford was a passive 
retailer and as such “did not owe a duty to its customers to warn them of a manufacturing defect that 
it did not know of itself.” Id. ¶ 9. 
 115. Sanns Brief, supra note 101, at 1. 
 116. Id. at 1–2. 
 117. See Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 14. 
 118. See id. ¶¶ 15–19. 
 119. Id. ¶ 14. 
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‘strict liability’ in defining fault is confusing and somewhat 
problematic,”120 the court declared that it refused to liken strict liability 
to a concept of culpability: 
The use of strict liability in this statutory definition should be viewed 
only as a cause of action subject to the [LRA], rather than changing the 
traditional use of the term fault to somehow include strict liability, a 
liability concept that is unconcerned with fault in the usual sense of 
culpability.121
The essence of this interpretation is that strict liability can indeed be 
included as a means of assigning liability under the LRA. For example, 
when a plaintiff brings one defendant into the action under a claim of 
negligence, the plaintiff would not be prohibited from bringing another 
defendant into the action under a theory of strict liability.122
Despite these assertions that strict liability does not equate to 
culpability, the court’s subsequent analysis demonstrates otherwise. The 
court next examined whether claims of strict liability are viable against 
multiple tortfeasors and began this examination by recognizing that 
“under general tort law principles, as between an injured buyer of a 
product and the seller of the product, the seller must bear the 
liability.”123 However, as the court noted, the LRA makes this analysis 
more nuanced: “this traditional principle [of tort law] conflicts with the 
clear language and intent of the [LRA],”124 which prohibits recovery 
from a defendant in excess of its fault.125 The court noted that many 
jurisdictions have expressly immunized passive sellers from strict 
liability suits and focused on those jurisdictions that have legislatively 
prohibited strict liability claims against a passive seller “unless the 
product manufacturer is unreachable or unable to satisfy the 
 120. Id. ¶ 14 n.5. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Cf. S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382–83 (Utah 1996) (applying the LRA to assign 
comparative liability to the defendant under a theory of strict liability and to the plaintiff under a 
theory of negligence). 
 123. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 15. It is important to note that this is actually the only time 
in the court’s decision that it refers to Section 402A, and it does so almost as an aside in a string 
citation. As will later be demonstrated, this is one of the major weaknesses of the court’s analysis. 
See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 124. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 15. 
 125. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(3) (2004) (“No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant . . . .”). 
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judgment.”126 Although the court was drawn to this form of passive 
seller immunization, it admitted that the LRA contained no such 
exclusion for passive sellers.127 Despite the absence of a direct passive-
seller immunization in the LRA, the court proceeded to examine the 
LRA to determine whether it could indirectly contain such an exclusion. 
The court ultimately held that the abrogation of joint and several 
liability and contribution and indemnification suits in the LRA amounted 
to an indirect immunization of passive sellers from strict liability. The 
court explained that the elimination of joint and several liability does not 
preclude a comparison of fault among multiple defendants brought under 
various theories of liability128 because the basic purpose of the LRA is 
fairness in the sense that no one defendant should be liable for more than 
its degree of fault.129 Second, the court indicated that the elimination of 
joint and several liability eradicated the need for contribution and 
indemnification suits because there is no possibility of being held liable 
to a degree greater than one’s fault.130 Thus, all potential defendants 
should be brought into the suit to be apportioned their degree of fault—
which, as has been shown, could be under a theory of strict liability—and 
because no one defendant will be apportioned an unfair degree of 
liability, there remains no ability to seek either contribution or 
indemnification. 
With that, the court affirmatively rejected Sanns’ assertion that “to 
the extent the retailer is held liable for the harm caused by the defective 
product, it may have a claim for indemnity against the manufacturer.”131 
 126. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 16. The court focuses on statutes from Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, and Washington, which all adopted rules to prohibit recovery from a passive seller unless 
recovery against a manufacturer is not feasible. See supra note 58 for a more thorough list of these 
types of statutes. 
 127. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 16 (stating Utah had no “explicit statutory exclusion” 
protecting passive sellers from strict liability). 
 128. Id. ¶ 18; see also, e.g., Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ¶ 10, 996 P.2d 540 
(finding that the LRA applies to strict liability in the Dramshop Liability Act); S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 
P.2d 1376, 1382–83 (Utah 1996).  
 129. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 130. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶¶ 19–20. In recounting this principle, the court relies heavily 
on its previous ruling in Nat’l Serv. Indus. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d 551, 554–55 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), in which it stated that “there remains no need for suits to redistribute loss among joint 
tortfeasors because no party will in any case be liable for more than its degree of fault in the 
underlying tort action.” Id. at 555. It will be recalled that the LRA expressly abolishes contribution 
suits. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (2004). 
 131. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 19 (internal quotations omitted). Indemnification and 
contribution based in contract, agreement, or statute are still acceptable under the LRA. See § 78-27-
43. 
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By rejecting this assertion, the court held that a passive seller cannot be 
sued under a theory of strict liability “with the idea that it may later seek 
indemnification or contribution from another.”132 The court reasoned 
that the possibility of a passive seller being found unfairly liable—with 
no possibility of seeking indemnification from the culpable party—
precludes the inclusion of a passive seller under a claim of strict liability 
when the culpable party is already included in the suit. Thus, the court 
judicially created a passive seller exemption to Section 402A by utilizing 
the demands of the LRA. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF SANNS AND A PROPOSAL 
FOR THE SHIFTING NATURE OF FAULT 
The Sanns court’s reasoning is anything but straightforward, and in 
the end, the court determined that the LRA subordinates Section 402A. 
Most simply, there are two principles driving the LRA—(1) no defendant 
can be liable for more than “the proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant” under the LRA;133 and (2) there is no possibility of 
contribution or indemnification suits to seek restitution for a finding of 
liability to an extent greater than one’s degree of fault.134 Because a 
passive seller could potentially be found liable for more than its share of 
fault and because such a passive seller would have no opportunity for 
indemnification, the court reasoned that a passive seller cannot be 
included in a strict liability claim. Although the court was not entirely 
clear, it appeared to hold that the manufacturer must be a party to the suit 
in order for the exclusion of the passive seller to take effect. This holding 
is clearly an attempt to adopt the type of legislative immunization that 
 132. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 20. 
 133. § 78-27-38(3). 
 134. The court’s final summation of its reasoning is worth noting: 
The strict liability “fault” in this case, if any, lies with the manufacturer, not with 
Butterfield Ford, the passive retailer. The [LRA] eliminated all aspects of joint and 
several liability, which means strict liability cannot be apportioned to Butterfield Ford, a 
passive seller, and also to Ford. Further, if Butterfield Ford were imposed with some or 
all of the fault actually belonging to Ford, Butterfield Ford no longer has the option of 
seeking indemnification or contribution from Ford in a subsequent suit. Therefore, as 
long as Ford is present in the suit, there remains no reason to require Butterfield Ford to 
incur the time and expense of defending this action, and consequently the trial court was 
correct to dismiss Butterfield Ford. 
Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21 (citation omitted). 
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protects passive sellers when a manufacturer is able to satisfy the 
judgment.135
However, this attempt simply created more problems than it solved. 
The court’s usurpation of legislative prerogative was unnecessary and 
gave rise to a number of potential problems that could drastically limit 
the ability of consumers to recover for damages caused by defective 
products. These problems could have been avoided by balancing the 
demands of the LRA with the doctrines of Section 402A and expanding 
comparative fault principles through the concept of shifting fault. 
Shifting fault refers to a two-step definition of fault: in the first step, fault 
is any theory of liability that allows a potential tortfeasor to be brought 
into a cause of action; in the second step, fault is equated to culpability to 
ensure a proper awarding of damages according to comparative fault 
principles. This approach to strict liability obviates the negative realities 
of Sanns while providing adequate remedies to harmed consumers and 
effective protection for innocent sellers. 
A. The Problems of Sanns 
Being overly concerned with protecting innocent sellers, the Sanns 
court was blind to the effects its decision could have on consumers’ 
remedies at law for damages caused by dangerous products. The major 
harmful effects of the decision stem from the ill-advised judicial 
immunization of passive sellers from Section 402A and are twofold: (1) 
the summary dismissal of Section 402A could portend the end of strict 
liability as a valid theory of liability; and (2) the silence on future 
application of the decision leaves harmed consumers without guidance as 
to when and under what theory of liability to join sellers, which 
consequently leaves consumers vulnerable to sanctions for improperly 
joining sellers in a cause of action. 
1. The legislature never intended to immunize passive sellers from strict 
liability suits 
The court’s judicial immunization of passive sellers from strict 
liability, based only on the elimination of joint and several liability, is 
extraordinary, unique, and unsupported by anything in the legislative 
history of the LRA. The decision is directly contrary to Utah courts’ 
 135. See supra note 58. 
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traditional policy of allowing the legislature to make the law136 and 
could have major ramifications on the ability of harmed consumers to 
recover against sellers. 
Many jurisdictions have created an express immunization for passive 
sellers from strict liability, and by so doing, have limited the effects of 
Section 402A. However, each of these jurisdictions has done so 
legislatively.137 Therefore, Sanns is unique because it created judicially 
what others states have done only legislatively. The very reason that 
many jurisdictions have sought to immunize passive sellers from strict 
liability is that they found the practice unjust138 and wasteful.139 The 
Sanns court was apparently drawn to rules in states that prohibit recovery 
against a passive seller when the manufacturer is subject to the cause of 
action140 and attempted to create a similar rule.  
 136. See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 684 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J., concurring) (citing 
Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974)). 
 137. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 138. As one commentator noted, “The application of strict liability to the non-negligent 
retailer and wholesaler has been criticized by one judge as ‘heavy-handed to the point of injustice.’” 
Cavico, supra note 43, at 227 (quoting Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P.2d 108, 117–18 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (Molloy, J., dissenting)). The commentator goes on to summarize expert 
testimony before Congress regarding the strict liability of passive sellers: 
The strict tort liability application to non-manufacturers has ultimately “produced a 
product liability system which is badly out of balance, and utterly lacking in equity and 
common sense. It no longer fairly adjudicates claims based on responsibility. Rather it 
has become a convenient mechanism to pay damages whenever someone is injured.” 
Id. at 228 (quoting The Nature and Causes of the Product Liability Problem: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 353–54 (1979) (statement of William C. McCamant, Vice Chairman of the 
Board, National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors)). 
 139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, cmt. e (1998) 
(“[B]ringing nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors into products liability litigation generates 
wasteful legal costs. Although liability in most cases is ultimately passed on to the manufacturer who 
is responsible for creating the product defect, nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors must devote 
resources to protect their interests.”). As explained by one commentator: “Once made a defendant, 
the non-manufacturer becomes involved in two lawsuits: one to defend against the plaintiff’s claim 
which involves the manufacturer’s product; the other to obtain indemnity from the responsible 
manufacturer.” Cavico, supra note 43, at 229. This process forces the passive seller to expend large 
amounts of money in seeking restitution, which in the end harms the passive seller because it is not 
indemnified for funds spent seeking indemnification. Id. 
 140. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. The rule adopted by the Sanns court 
mirrors the rules in jurisdictions that prohibit recovery against a passive seller when the 
manufacturer is named in the suit. Compare Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21 (holding that “as long 
as [the manufacturer] is present in the suit, there remains no reason to require [the passive seller] to 
incur the time and expense of defending this action”), with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-621 
(2004) (stating “[i]n any product liability action based on any theory or doctrine commenced or 
maintained against a defendant or defendants other than the manufacturer, that party shall upon 
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However, the court’s holding in Sanns that the abrogation of joint 
and several liability necessarily created a passive-seller exemption to 
strict liability is unprecedented. In his brief to the appellate court, Sanns 
pointed out that “in every jurisdiction in which a passive retailer is not 
liable as a matter of law, it is because the jurisdiction’s product liability 
act expressly so provides.”141 Sanns further explained that “[i]n no 
jurisdiction . . . has the mere abolition of joint and several liability been 
held to immunize a passive retailer from strict products liability.”142 
Viewed in this light, the court’s decision is a novel application of a 
liability reform measure that was not directed at passive sellers in a strict 
liability suit. 
Furthermore, the decision is directly contrary to legislative intent: no 
direct evidence indicates that the legislature ever intended to eliminate 
strict liability even in cases when a passive seller is found strictly 
liable.143 Had the legislature so intended, it could have followed the lead 
of other legislatures and passed a measure granting passive sellers direct 
immunization from strict liability suits. The legislature merely sought to 
assure that defendants would be liable only to the extent of their fault.144 
By ignoring the legislative purpose of the LRA, the Sanns court 
sidestepped traditional judicial practice in Utah requiring courts to “defer 
answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer 
of the product allegedly causing injury, death or damage”).  
 141. Sanns Brief, supra note 101, at 23. 
 142. Id.; see e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Lexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2506(F)(2) (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116(b) (West Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 668.1(1) (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(8) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 604.01 subd. 1a (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(1) (Lexis 1999); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 27-1-705(8) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01 & -02 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 
4.22.015 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Lexis 2003). These statutes each include in 
their definition of fault the term “strict liability.” Not one of these jurisdictions has used its 
comparative fault statutes to immunize a passive seller from strict liability; rather, those that have 
immunized passive sellers have done so expressly in their products liability statutes. See Sanns Brief, 
supra note 101, at 22–23. 
 143. 46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986) (statement of Assistant 
Attorney General Steve Sorenson) (“The [LRA] does not . . . change the substantive law of strict 
liability . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 144. “It is the basic fairness concept we’re driving at. The defendant ought to be on the hook 
only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor for everyone else’s 
damages.” Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting 46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986) (statement of 
Assistant Attorney General Steve Sorenson)), superceded by statute in part as stated in Anderson v. 
United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d 903, 907. See supra notes 97–101 and 
accompanying text for an explanation that, in the context of the LRA, strict liability is a form of 
fault. 
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to the legislature to make laws”145 and became the first court in the 
United States to judicially create a passive seller exemption based upon a 
statutory abrogation of joint and several liability.146 As the following 
discussion will demonstrate, this sidestep of legislative intent could have 
great impact on tort liability in Utah. 
2. The court’s dismissal of Section 402A 
Sanns’ judicially created passive-seller exemption can further be 
seen as a general renunciation of Section 402A strict liability principles 
and a movement back to liability solely based upon culpability. This 
renunciation is likely to act as a restriction on the theories of liability 
under which a harmed consumer can join potential defendants in a 
products liability action. 
With all of the ambiguity and subtlety of the Sanns decision, there 
remains one aspect of the decision that is truly vexing: the absence of a 
Section 402A analysis.147 As this Note has shown, Section 402A has 
guided Utah courts’ strict liability analyses since the adoption of the 
principle in Hahn and continuing with the LRA.148 The novel situation 
facing the Sanns court was that it had the express opportunity to decide 
how the strict liability principles of Section 402A, which allow the 
inclusion of passive sellers under a theory of strict liability,149 
juxtaposed with the fault principles of the LRA, which eliminated the 
joint and several liability of multiple tortfeasors.150 Without analysis of 
Section 402A or its place in Utah jurisprudence, the court subordinated 
the principles underlying Section 402A to the demands of the LRA and, 
by so doing, created a judicial immunization for passive sellers.151 This 
 145. Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 684 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J., concurring) (citing Stanton 
v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974)). 
 146. See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. 
 147. As has been previously noted, the court mentions Section 402A only once, and that 
mention occurs in a string cite. See Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 15, 94 P.3d 301. 
 148. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part II.B. 
 150. See supra Part II.D. 
 151. Butterfield Ford incorrectly argued to the court that Section 402A was entirely 
superceded by the LRA: 
 In light of (i) the express language of the [LRA] prohibiting a defendant from being held 
liable for any damages in excess of its proportionate share of fault, (ii) the purpose of the 
Act to eliminate the very unfairness created by Section 402A, and (iii) the abolishment of 
joint and several liability and separate actions for contribution or indemnification, the 
principles set forth in Section 402A cannot be reconciled with the [LRA]. 
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logic raises the strong possibility that this ruling can be seen as a 
renunciation of strict liability principles and a movement back to pure 
negligence principles when liability is based solely on culpability. 
At a minimum, this movement back towards culpability means that 
in cases involving a manufacturer and a passive distributor, only those 
parties who are culpable are liable. The Sanns court walked a fine line in 
trying to distinguish strict liability from culpability and, in the end, 
failed. Although the court stressed early in its strict liability analysis that 
“strict liability in this statutory definition should be viewed only as a 
cause of action subject to the [LRA], rather than changing the traditional 
use of the term fault to somehow include strict liability,”152 it later 
conceded that “[t]he strict liability ‘fault’ in this case, if any, lies with the 
manufacturer, not with Butterfield Ford, the passive retailer.”153  
Such logic can succeed only if strict liability no longer connotes an 
absolute duty and instead equates to culpability. By thus combining these 
principles, the court implicitly rejected the doctrines of Section 402A in 
cases involving a passive seller and a manufacturer. Section 402A allows 
“[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition”154 to be sued 
under a theory of strict liability, but this principle cannot be reconciled 
with the Sanns decision, which allows only a manufacturer to be 
subjected to strict products liability.155 Thus, in the process of creating a 
judicial immunization for passive sellers from strict liability, the Sanns 
court implicitly rejected the doctrine of Section 402A with respect to 
passive sellers and equated strict liability with culpability. 
Butterfield Ford Brief, supra note 91, at 21. This argument fails because Utah courts continued to 
rely on Section 402A following the passage of the LRA and because the legislative history of the 
LRA demonstrates that it was never intended to supercede or supplant the doctrine of strict liability: 
The [LRA] does not . . . change the substantive law of strict liability . . . . [I]f you have 
multiple defendants, one of whom is guilty of negligence, one of whom is guilty of strict 
liability, the jury in apportioning fault, apportions fault between those parties regardless 
of the theory on which the party is liable. 
46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986) (statement of Assistant Attorney 
General Steve Sorenson). 
 152. Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 14 n.5, 94 P.3d 301. 
 153. Id. ¶ 21. 
 154. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 402A(1). 
 155. The court stresses that “[t]he strict liability ‘fault’ in this case, if any, lies with the 
manufacturer, not with Butterfield Ford, the passive retailer.” Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21. This 
language contradicts the language in Section 402A allowing any seller to be included in a claim of 
strict liability; therefore, this sentence would be more appropriate—and more revealing of the court’s 
actual intention—were it to say: “[t]he [negligence or culpability] in this case, if any, lies with the 
manufacturer, not with Butterfield Ford, the passive retailer.” Id. 
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Were it otherwise, both Butterfield Ford and Ford could have 
remained in the suit under a theory of strict liability to allow a jury to 
apportion fault between them.156 Under the general approach espoused 
by Utah courts, an analysis of fault involves two steps: first, parties are 
brought into the action under any theory of liability—negligence, breach 
of warranty, strict liability, product liability, etc.—without an 
examination of their culpability; 157 second, the parties present their 
defenses to the jury so the jury can apportion fault after weighing their 
respective culpability in accordance with the provisions of the LRA. In 
contrast, under the standard adopted by Sanns, in strict liability cases 
involving a passive seller and a manufacturer, the analysis is simply a 
one-step process: only the culpable party is allowed in the suit.158 For 
purposes of fault apportionment in strict products liability cases, fault 
under the LRA is equivalent to culpability.  
The concomitant effect of this general renunciation of strict liability 
is that harmed consumers are limited to theories of negligence and 
breach of warranty when trying to bring parties into a cause of action. As 
this Note has shown, however, strict liability exists to cover those 
situations when negligence and breach of warranty are insufficient to 
remedy the harmed consumer.159 Sanns thus created the possibility that 
harmed consumers could be left without remedy if they cannot 
successfully pursue negligence or warranty actions.160
 156. This is what a jury does when strict liability is alleged against one party and negligence 
against another. See S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382–83 (Utah 1996). See infra Part IV.B for 
a full explanation of how comparative fault could be extended to combine the principles of the LRA 
and Section 402A. 
 157. Mulherin typifies this approach in that it explains that the trier of fact should engage in an 
examination of comparative fault after the action has begun. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
628 P.2d 1301, 1303–04 (Utah 1981). 
 158. This is the exact principle that Butterfield Ford argued to the Sanns court. See Butterfield 
Ford Brief, supra note 91, at 26. 
The [LRA] and its purposes clearly contemplate some form of culpable conduct on the 
part of the defendant. . . . [Fault] requires some “breach,” “act” or “omission.” . . . 
  This is not to say that sellers or distributors of products can never be at fault under 
the [LRA] for damages caused by the products they sell or distribute. If a seller or 
distributor of a product breaches some duty or engages in some culpable conduct which 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries, the seller or distributor could potentially be at fault 
under the [LRA]. However, where there is no evidence of any breach of legal duty or 
culpable act or omission on the part of a seller or distributor, the [LRA] does not support 
a claim against such a defendant. 
Id. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 21–29. 
 160. See supra note 155. If a product were to harm a consumer, but the manufacturer was not 
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3. The court provided no guidelines detailing how its holding is to be 
applied 
Further, the Sanns court failed to provide any guidance on future 
application of its novel holding. Indirect immunization of passive sellers 
without proper guidance from the court will lead to confusion among 
both parties and courts as they attempt to apply the Sanns rule. Such 
confusion coupled with the general renunciation of strict liability 
principles described above161 could greatly impact the ability of harmed 
consumers to receive adequate compensation from liable parties. Two 
uncertainties that are particularly conspicuous will demonstrate the 
foreseeable effects of Sanns on future strict products liability actions: (1) 
whether a passive seller may be joined in a products liability suit, and (2) 
whether a passive seller can be strictly liable when the manufacturer is 
not present in the suit. 
 
a. Joining a passive seller in a products liability suit. The Sanns 
court provided little guidance as to who is a prima facie passive seller 
and obfuscated how future harmed consumers will bring potentially 
liable parties into the cause of action. The only language in Sanns that 
defines a passive seller designates a passive seller as one that “[does] not 
participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing, or assembly 
of the [product].”162 A plausible interpretation of the Sanns decision is 
that future harmed consumers could bear the burden of determining 
whether a potential defendant had engaged in any of these activities and 
is, therefore, a passive seller immune from suit. More specifically, the 
burden is likely to come in the form of costs and attorneys fees awarded 
to a passive seller brought into the strict liability suit or in the form of 
Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff for failing to conduct an inquiry 
negligent and breached no warranty, Sanns would likely allow the manufacturer to be brought into 
the cause of action under a theory of strict liability because it manufactured the product, which 
would constitute culpable conduct. See Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21. There is no logical 
distinction then to exclude passive sellers from claims of strict liability because their culpable 
conduct consisted of selling the product. The policy of strict liability to promote safe products is 
aimed at both manufacturers and sellers. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
Sanns decision is inherently self-contradictory in that it would continue to allow strict liability to 
bring a nonnegligent manufacturer into a cause of action but not a nonnegligent seller, despite the 
fact that the policy of strict liability applies to both entities with equal force. 
 161. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 162. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21. 
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reasonable under the circumstances163 to determine if a seller was 
passive. Because the Sanns court provided no guidance on this issue, 
future passive sellers brought into a strict liability claim are very likely to 
seek such awards and sanctions against plaintiffs whenever they are 
brought into an action under a theory of strict liability; the threat of 
sanctions in turn is very likely to mitigate consumers’ willingness to 
pursue strict liability claims against sellers regardless of the sellers’ 
passivity. 
Compare this burden with the approaches adopted in other 
jurisdictions that have enacted passive seller immunization in cases 
where a manufacturer is subject to suit. In the majority of these 
jurisdictions, the passive seller must establish its passivity after being 
brought into the suit, and it must certify that the manufacturer is subject 
to suit and is solvent.164 This rule necessarily protects harmed consumers 
in these jurisdictions from the threat of costs and sanctions. 
 163. UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(b). “Rule 11 requires the plaintiff’s attorney to certify that ‘the 
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . are likely to have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Robinson 
v. Morrow, 2004 UT App. 285, ¶ 24 n.3, 99 P.3d 341 (quoting UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)); see also 
Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, ¶ 28, 15 P.3d 1021 (explaining when Rule 11 sanctions are 
appropriate); Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (awarding sanctions 
when the claim was “founded on innuendo and suspicion”), aff’d, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255. 
 164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001(c) (2004) (stating that the passive seller 
exemption is not available if the seller cannot “identify the manufacturer through reasonable 
effort”); IDAHO CODE § [6-1407](4)(a), (b) (Michie 2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-621(a)-
(c) (2004) (“In any product liability action based on any theory or doctrine commenced or 
maintained against a defendant or defendants other than the manufacturer, that party shall upon 
answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer 
of the product allegedly causing injury, death or damage.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306(d), (e) 
(2003) (“A product seller shall not be subject to liability in a product liability claim arising from an 
alleged defect in a product, if the product seller establishes that: (d) the manufacturer of the 
defective product or product component is subject to service of process either under the laws of the 
state of Kansas or the domicile of the person making the product liability claim . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2004) (placing the burden on the seller to 
establish that it was indeed a passive seller); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 2004) (“In any 
product liability action based in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or maintained 
against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that party shall upon answering or otherwise 
pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product allegedly 
causing injury, death or damage.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (2004) (stating that it is the passive 
seller that must make a motion for dismissal after being brought into the suit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-01.3-04 (2004) (“In any products liability action maintained against a seller of a product who did 
not manufacture the product, the seller shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit 
certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing the personal 
injury, death, or damage to property.” (emphasis added)). But cf. IOWA CODE § 613.18(3) (2004) 
(dividing the burden between both the passive seller and plaintiff by allowing the process of 
discovery to reveal the manufacturer); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (2004) (prohibiting the 
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Furthermore, the potential of costs and sanctions imposed upon the 
harmed consumer conflicts with the express language of the LRA, which 
allows plaintiffs to join “any person . . . who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.”165 
The purpose of the LRA is to allow harmed parties to bring all 
defendants who may have caused the harm into the cause of action, 
allowing both sides to present their case to the jury, which then 
apportions fault appropriately.166 Contrary to the LRA’s policy, the 
threat of costs and sanctions most likely requires that the harmed 
consumer conduct much of this analysis beforehand or be subject to 
potential costs and sanctions. 
 
b. Strict liability when no manufacturer is subject to suit. The second 
uncertainty is whether a passive seller can be subject to strict liability 
when the manufacturer is unable to satisfy judgment. The language of 
Sanns implies, but does not explicitly state, that the passive seller is 
immune from strict liability only when a manufacturer is a party to the 
suit.167 Further, when the manufacturer cannot satisfy judgment, the 
court failed to state whether the passive seller should be sued under a 
strict liability claim or under another theory, such as breach of warranty 
or negligence. As discussed above, most jurisdictions that protect passive 
sellers from strict liability have enacted specific rules requiring that the 
passive seller certify the manufacturer is solvent and subject to suit in 
that jurisdiction.168 The Sanns decision again falls short and fails to 
explain not only who should certify whether the manufacturer is subject 
to suit but also whether the passive seller can be strictly liable when no 
manufacturer is present.169  
commencement of an action against a passive seller unless the manufacturer is not subject to the suit 
or the seller is not passive); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 2004) (placing the burden 
on the plaintiff rather than the seller); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (2004) (disallowing action 
against a passive seller unless the manufacturer is not subject to suit); WASH. REV. CODE § 7-
72.040(2)(a), (b) (2004) (stating conditions under which the passive seller is liable). 
 165. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-41(1) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 166. See §§ 78-27-38 to -39. 
 167. Sanns, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21 (“[A]s long as [the manufacturer] is present in the suit, 
there remains no reason to require [the passive seller] to incur the time and expense of defending this 
action, and consequently the trial court was correct to dismiss [the passive seller].” (emphasis 
added)). 
 168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 169. The logic of the court’s holding is further complicated by the fact that the manufacturer, 
Ford, was not a party to the action when the appellate court announced its decision. Although 
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These uncertainties further demonstrate that the Sanns court went out 
of its way to protect potentially innocent sellers at the expense of the 
rights of innocent consumers to compensation. Such uncertainties 
exemplify why Utah’s standard is normally to allow the legislature to 
make the law.170
 
B. A More Balanced Approach to Strict Liability Analysis: The Shifting 
Definition of Fault 
This Note has already hinted at an approach that can satisfy the LRA 
without creating an indirect judicial immunization of passive sellers, 
without dismissing Section 402A’s doctrine of strict liability, and 
without potentially subjecting the harmed consumer to costs and 
sanctions—a two-step examination of fault that extends comparative 
fault principles into the realm of passive sellers.171 By remedying the 
harms of the Sanns decision, the proposed two-part approach to fault 
provides for the fair treatment of both innocent consumers and innocent 
sellers. 
Although the Sanns court initially stressed that strict liability is not 
fault in the sense that it requires no culpability, it later implicitly equated 
fault with culpability.172 By so doing, the court dismissed the application 
of Section 402A for passive sellers. However, by splitting the fault 
analysis into a two-step process, it is possible to maintain at least a 
semblance of Section 402A and to satisfy the demands of the LRA 
without the burdens and complications of creating an indirect passive 
seller immunization. This division is essentially a shifting definition of 
fault: first, fault is defined as any theory of liability consistent with the 
LRA under which a plaintiff can join a potential defendant to the cause 
initially brought in the same action as Butterfield Ford, Ford had removed its case to the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah and was “seeking to consolidate it with two other cases 
pending in the district court involving the same accident.” Sanns 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 3 n.1. Thus, 
Ford was not “present in the suit,” id. ¶ 21, as the Sanns court asserted, but had removed its suit to a 
federal district court. This created a situation in which the plaintiff would have no recourse against 
the passive seller because of the Sanns decision, and in which the plaintiff did not have the 
opportunity of having a Utah court decide the merits of the claim against the manufacturer. This 
scenario begs the question of whether all that is required to absolve passive sellers from strict 
liability is that the manufacturer is somewhere subject to suit regardless of where that is. 
 170. See supra Part IV.A.1 and text accompanying notes 141–46. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 156–58. 
 172. See supra Part III.B and Part IV.A.2. 
4BUR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:35:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
510 
 
of action; second, fault is equated to culpability for purposes of liability 
apportionment. 
The first step in this analysis is to allow the plaintiff to join any party 
who may have contributed to the plaintiff’s damages under any theory of 
liability consistent with the LRA.173 This could include a theory of strict 
liability for a passive seller and a manufacturer and would be done 
without any examination of culpability. Fault under this approach is most 
appropriately defined simply as a possible theory of liability under which 
a plaintiff can join a defendant in a tort action.174
For example, in the Sanns case, Sanns would be allowed to bring 
both Butterfield Ford and Ford into the action under a theory of strict 
liability. This is consistent not only with Utah’s doctrine of strict liability 
according to Section 402A, which allows a seller “of any product in a 
defective condition”175 to be brought into a strict liability action, but also 
with prior Utah decisions that allow strict liability claims under the 
LRA.176 This step further satisfies the LRA’s requirement that all parties 
“who may have caused”177 the damages are brought into the initial tort 
action. 
The second step involves a true application of the fault 
apportionment principles of the LRA and extends the Mulherin 
comparative fault principle into the realm of passive seller liability. In 
this step, fault is identified solely as culpability in order to correctly 
apportion damages: any nonculpable party, such as a truly passive seller, 
could not be apportioned fault consistent with the language of the 
LRA.178 Here, the plaintiff is required to present its case before the trier 
 173. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (2004) lists the following as viable theories of liability: 
“negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a 
product.” 
 174. Allowing the joining of any party is particularly important considering the Utah Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998), which limited application of 
comparative fault principles to plaintiffs, defendants, and persons immune from suit. Id. at 1080–82; 
see also Wright, supra note 68, at 575–77 (explaining the effects of the Field decision). Thus, by 
immunizing passive sellers from Section 402A strict liability, Sanns completely precluded 
application of comparative fault principles because the passive seller cannot be a party to the strict 
liability suit. 
 175. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 402A(1). 
 176. See, e.g., S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382–83 (Utah 1996) (apportioning fault 
under Utah’s strict liability dog-bite statute). 
 177. § 78-27-41(1). 
 178. § 78-27-38(3) (“No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant . . . .”). 
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of fact in an effort to establish the culpability of each party. In turn, each 
defendant is given the opportunity to state its affirmative defenses. A 
passive seller, for example, is allowed to affirmatively establish its 
passivity.179 The court would apportion damages according to the 
percentage of culpability for which the trier of fact found each party 
liable. 
The judge could grant a passive seller a motion for summary 
judgment and dismiss the passive seller from the suit if the seller could 
establish that there is no question of material fact regarding its 
passivity.180 The judge as a matter of law would be free to dismiss the 
seller because the judge would be prohibited from apportioning a non-
culpable party any fault.181 If there remained a question of material fact 
regarding the seller’s passivity, the case would proceed to trial to allow 
the trier of fact to compare the culpability among the parties. 
For example, in Sanns the two-step approach to fault would require 
Butterfield Ford to establish its passivity, after becoming party to the 
suit. If Butterfield Ford could do so, the court would be prohibited from 
apportioning any degree of fault to Butterfield Ford.  
 179. Most likely, factors the Sanns court listed as characteristics of a passive seller would be 
characteristics the potentially passive seller would seek to establish before the court. The factors 
include actions such as not participating in the “design, manufacture, engineering, testing, or 
assembly” of the final product. Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶ 21, 94 P.3d 301. 
 180. The Utah Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standards as follows:  
Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether a 
material issue of fact exists that must be resolved by the fact finder. The party moving for 
summary judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as 
applied to an undisputed material issue of fact. 
Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp. 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (internal citations omitted). Of 
particular interest to the present analysis is the fact that the burden of establishing passivity remains 
on the seller throughout the proceedings thereby curing the problems described supra in Part 
IV.A.3.a. 
 181. The determination of whether a seller is a passive seller depends on the facts of each 
case, but each determination would involve application of a legal standard, most likely a standard 
similar to that indirectly articulated by the Sanns court. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
Thus, a passive seller could establish its passivity on a motion for summary judgment and be 
dismissed from the suit before going to trial. The application of a legal standard to the facts of each 
case creates an unusual standard for appellate review:  
The application of a legal standard, once articulated . . . involves varying degrees of 
discretion depending on the standard in question. If the application of the standard is 
extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing court should generally give the trial court 
considerable discretion in determining whether the facts of a particular case come within 
the established rule of law.  
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (citations omitted). 
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Admittedly, this process—the second step in particular—deviates 
from the concept of strict liability as an absolute duty that is separate 
from any notion of culpability, as Section 402A mandates;182 however, it 
deviates less from this concept than the Sanns ruling does in that it first 
allows a strict liability claim to bring defendants into the action. 
Furthermore, equating strict liability with a concept of culpability after 
bringing all potentially liable parties into the action is consistent with the 
comparative principles of strict liability set out in Mulherin and Bistryski. 
In these cases the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that strict liability does 
not equate to absolute liability and that culpable conduct can be a factor 
even in strict liability cases.183 Since Mulherin, Utah courts have 
compared the relative “fault” of plaintiffs and defendants in strict 
liability cases,184 and this second step simply extends this comparison 
into the realm of passive sellers and manufacturers. 
Thus, comparative fault in a strict liability action under this approach 
connotes not only a comparison of the relative fault of plaintiffs and 
defendants185 but also a comparison of the relative fault among the 
defendants. In explaining why a comparison of “proportion of fault” is 
appropriate in cases involving strict liability, the Bistryski court stated: 
By including “strict liability” in the definition of fault, the legislature 
clearly intended comparative fault principles to be applied to strict 
liability claims, and nothing in the language of the [LRA] suggests that 
a defendant . . . who is strictly liable should pay damages in excess of 
his or her proportion of fault. Thus, although [such defendants] are 
strictly liable for damages, . . . the percentage of those damages which 
the [defendant] must pay is determined by the comparative fault 
provisions of the [LRA]. The fault of another party may have 
contributed to the injury and may preclude finding [the defendant] 
responsible for 100% of the damages arising out of such injuries.186
The Sanns court’s equation of strict liability with culpability is not 
entirely inconsistent with this language, yet the equation nonetheless 
 182. See supra Part II.B. 
 183. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Utah 1981) (“Other courts 
have rejected the application of comparative fault principles to strict liability claims because 
culpable conduct is not at issue in strict liability, only causation. We find this unpersuasive.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 184. See, e.g., Interwest Constr. v. Palmer 923 P.2d 1350, 1356–57 (Utah 1996); S.H. v. 
Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382–83 (Utah 1996).  
 185. This is the traditional understanding of comparative fault exemplified by Mulherin. See 
Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1302–04. 
 186. Bistryski, 923 P.2d at 1380 (emphasis added). 
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fails. By prohibiting plaintiffs from even bringing a potentially passive 
seller into a strict liability action without the threat of sanctions, the 
Sanns court effectually precluded an examination of the “proportion of 
fault” for which a potentially passive seller might be liable.187 The two-
step approach to fault cures this defect because it first allows all 
potentially liable defendants into the action, consistent with LRA and 
Section 402A, and then, consistent with Mulherin and Bistryski, 
examines the comparative/proportional fault of each defendant. Thus, 
equating strict liability to a concept of culpability is appropriate only 
after all potentially liable defendants are brought into a suit and each 
defendant has the opportunity to establish its “proportion of fault.”188
Thus, the two-step approach remedies the negative consequences of 
Sanns’ judicial immunization of passive sellers because passive sellers 
can still be brought into the action under a theory of strict liability.189 
Accordingly, the two-step approach to fault cures the Sanns court’s 
summary dismissal of Section 402A by allowing all potentially liable 
parties into the action—the effect of which is the continuing viability of 
strict liability as a cause of action.  
Furthermore, and most importantly, under the two-step approach to 
fault, the harmed consumer can bring any party into the action without 
fear of costs and sanctions being imposed upon it, so long as the joined 
defendant “may have caused or contributed” to the harm.190 The LRA 
standard of joining potential defendants would control over the higher 
“reasonable investigation” standard of Rule 11 sanctions.191 Thus, the 
harmed consumer must simply assure that the theory under which it is 
pursuing the defendant is a viable theory of liability within the context of 
the LRA. Moreover, the shifting-fault approach does not result in 
confusion when no manufacturer can satisfy the judgment. Passive 
 187. Thus, the Sanns court ignored the very real possibility that some sellers may consider 
themselves passive but in reality may have done something to affect the product before selling it to 
the end consumer. Such a seller may be ninety-five percent passive but nonetheless liable for five 
percent of damages. The Sanns analysis presents a binary analysis in which a seller is either passive 
or not passive; this analysis simply does not withstand scrutiny in every situation. 
 188. Bistryski, 923 P.2d at 1380. Equating strict liability to culpability after allowing strict 
liability to bring any potential defendant into an action is the fundamental difference between the 
Sanns court’s treatment of Section 402A and the two-step approach’s treatment of Section 402A. 
Furthermore, this is the reason it is acceptable to treat strict liability as culpability in the second step 
of the fault analysis. 
 189. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 190. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-41(1) (2004). 
 191. UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(b); see supra Part IV.A.3.a and note 163. 
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sellers could be brought into the cause of action under any viable LRA 
theory of liability—regardless of whether a manufacturer is present in the 
suit—and damages would be apportioned following an examination of 
each defendant’s “proportion of fault.”192 Hence, there is no uncertainty 
in trying to correctly define who and under what circumstances a party 
can be a passive seller and thus be immune from strict liability. By 
continuing to allow all potential tortfeasors into the action, subject only 
to the requirements of the LRA, this approach to fault guarantees that 
innocent consumers will not be left without remedy—a definite risk 
under the Sanns analysis given the resultant uncertainties of the 
decision.193
Finally, the shifting-fault approach satisfies all of the concerns the 
Sanns court raised regarding application of strict liability against passive 
sellers. The court was primarily concerned with two issues: (1) the 
fairness of fault apportionment under the LRA, and (2) the eradication of 
contribution and indemnification suits.194 The court was especially 
concerned that if Butterfield Ford were in some manner apportioned 
fault, it would have no redress in the form of indemnification from Ford. 
Under the two-step approach to fault, the “basic fairness”195 that the 
LRA was aiming for is satisfied because the plaintiff can bring all 
potential defendants into the action, yet each defendant will be liable 
only to the extent of its fault. If a passive seller can establish its passivity, 
it is precluded from damage apportionment. Thus, there is no need for 
contribution or indemnification suits in contravention of the LRA and 
Utah case law.196 Ultimately, this approach is not only fair to harmed 
consumers, but it is equally fair to innocent sellers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The court in Sanns faced a truly difficult issue: how to satisfy the 
demands of the LRA with the demands of Section 402A strict liability. 
 192. Bistryski, 923 P.2d at 1380. 
 193. See supra Part IV.A. 
 194. Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App. 203, ¶¶ 17–20, 94 P.3d 301. 
 195. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting 46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Sen. CD No. 63, 6) (Feb. 12, 1986)), superceded by 
statute in part as stated in Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d 903, 907. 
 196. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (2004) (prohibiting contribution suits); Nat’l Serv. 
Indus., Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d 551, 554–56 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (equating 
indemnification suits to contributions suits and thus prohibiting such suits because “there remains no 
need for suits to redistribute loss among joint tortfeasors because no party will in any case be liable 
for more than its degree of fault in the underlying tort action”). 
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The LRA’s prohibition of joint and several liability along with its 
demand that no defendant be apportioned a degree of liability greater 
than its degree of fault presented the court with a circuitous opportunity 
to judicially create an immunization from strict liability in tort for 
passive sellers. The Sanns court’s decision to judicially create a passive 
seller immunization from strict liability is troublesome because it goes 
against the legislative intent of the LRA, it dismisses Section 402A 
without analysis or comment, and it leaves unresolved how the decision 
is to be applied in future cases. In short, the decision diminishes the 
ability of harmed consumers to receive adequate compensation in favor 
of providing an overly broad protection for sellers. 
A two-step approach to fault obviates these negative realities of the 
Sanns decision while successfully balancing the demands of Utah’s strict 
liability jurisprudence with the abrogation of joint and several liability in 
the LRA. By applying different definitions of fault at different stages of 
the trial, fault apportionment becomes a two-step process that satisfies 
Section 402A’s doctrine of bringing any seller into a strict liability action 
and achieves the equity in damage apportionment mandated by the LRA. 
The two-step approach highlights Utah’s acceptance of comparative fault 
principles and extends these principles into the realm of the LRA’s fault 
apportionment evaluations involving passive sellers. The definitive 
advantage of the two-step approach to fault is the resultant equity to both 
harmed consumers and innocent defendants. 
Jason R. Burt 
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